PENNSYLVANIA RULE AS TO ADMISSIBILITY OF
EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH CONTEMPORANEOUS
INDUCING PROMISES TO AFFECT WRITTEN INSTRUMENTS*

"We have stated on several occasions recently that we propose to stand for the integrity of written contracts. We reiterate
our position in this regard." 1 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, as presently constituted, seems at times inclined to terminate the line of confusing cases representing varying decisions
and containing misleading dicta and contradictory general state-2
ments of the law as to the admissibility of evidence showing oral,
inducing promises or agreements made contemporaneously with
the execution of a written contract, in itself full, complete and
unambiguous. Attention has been called long ago to "much apparent and some real conflict" 3 in our numerous cases involving
the question as to when "parol testimony" 4 is admissible to affect
written instruets, but it would appear that no one has succeeded, up to the present time, in framing a statement of the
*The principal purpose of this paper is to analyze recent decisions with a
view to supplementing a carefully prepared article under the same title by
Stanley Folz, Esquire, of the Philadelphia Bar, in 52 AME ICAN L. EG. 6o
(1904). There the early history and development of the "Pennsylvania rule"
will be found, so its reiteration here in detail is unnecessary.
'Mr. Justice Schaffer in Gianni v. Russell & Co., Inc., 281 Pa. 32o (1924).
The "several occasions" are Wolverine Glass Co. v. Miller, 279 Pa. 138 (x924)
wherein it is said: "It may not be amiss to say that we are not disposed to
widen the rules as to the admissibility of such testimony [oral, inducing promises], but rather to narrow it and to hold persons to their contracts as they
write them"; Evans v. Edelstein et al., 276 Pa. S16 (1923); Neville v. Kretzschmar, 271 Pa. 222 (1921). It is interesting to note that all three opinions
were written by Mr.. Justice Schaffer.
'The word "oral" is used because the evidence offered is usually of oral,
inducing agreements. The rule applies as well to written agreements outside
the contract. See Note 4, infra.
'Mr. Justice Dean in Fuller v. Law, 207 Pa. ioX (19o3).

'This phrase has long been and still is used by the Pennsylvania and
other courts to refer to testimony of promises or agreements outside the written
instrument, although the Supreme Court has said that "the word prol is used
to distinguish contracts which are made verbally, or in writing not under seal,
from those which are under seal." Kime v. Tobyhanna Creek Ice Company,
24o Pa. 61 (1913). "Parol," according to Webster, has two meanings in law:
x. oral and 2. written but not under seal. Wigmore siys that it "signifies and
implies essentially the idea 'oral,' i. e., matter of speech, as contrasted with
matter of writing." He then ioints out that the phrase "parol evidence rule"
is not complete since it conveys the impression that what is excluded is excluded
because it is oral, whereas the rule may operate to exclude as well what is written, e. g., letters and telegrams.

s WrGmoax, EvIDENcE, 237 (2nd ed. z923).
(235)
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Pennsylvania law acceptable as a new starting point. Professor
Wigmore probably had prominently in mind the Pennsylvania
cases when he wrote that "the so-called Parol Evidence rule is
attended with a confusion and an obscurity which make it the
most discouraging subject in the whole field of Evidence." 5 In
the recent case of Gianni v. Russell & Co., Inc., 6 the courts of
Pennsylvania have a new datum point. The case sets forth the
proper test to determine the admissibility of the kind of evidence
here being considered; it offers an opportunity to our courts to
clarify the law. Such opportunities have, however, been lost
before by our Supreme Court.7
Theoretically, the law on a particular subject is as announced
by the highest court of the state in the most recent pertinent decision. In the case, however, of a subject such as is being reviewed here, with its various aspects and intricacies, and the
numerous ways in which it arises, it takes more than one decision
definitely to settle the law and we must look to more than one of
the most recent cases. After such an examination, can an answer
be given to the question whether the so-called "parol evidence"
rule applies in Pennsylvania today in the case of contemporaneous oral promises alleged to have induced the execution of a written instrument? Professor Wigmore has, with his usual discernment, pointed out that there is no one and undivided parol evidence rule," but in propounding the above question it is meant to
'Wigmore, ib. op., 236.
'281 Pa. 32o (1924).
'There are many cases in which our Supreme Court has flatly refused to
allow evidence of contemporaneous, oral agreements even though they were
alleged to have induced the execution of the written contract. The strongest
opinions are to be found in Martin v. Berens, 67 Pa. 459 (x871); Thorne, McFarlane & Co. v. Warfflein, ioo Pa. 519 (1882); Irvin v. Irvin, r42 Pa. 271
(s8g); Wodock v. Robinson, 148 Pa. 503 (1892); Dixon-Woods Co. v. Phillips Glass Co., 169 Pa. 167 (1895) ; Union Storage Co. v. Speck, 194 Pa. 126
(x899); Krueger v. Nicola, 205 Pa. 38 (0903); Fuller v. Law, 2o7 Pa. ioi
(1903). That the court was consciously attempting to tighten up the
against parol evidence is evident from a statement by Dean, J., in Fullerrule
v.
Law, .rpra: "Since the legislation, however, allowing the parties to [writtenl
instruments to testify in their own behalf, we have endeavored to save whatever is left of the rule 'that parol evidence is inadmissible to vary or contradict written instruments' by somewhat more rigid rulings tending to exclude
parol evidence. We concede, success in that direction has not as yet been
what we hope for."
'5 Wigmore, ib. op., 237.
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ask whether a plaintiff or defendant in a suit on a written instrument may show that he was induced to sign the written agreement, under seal or not, by reason of certain statements or promises made by the other party to it but not included in the terms of
the writing. There are many different kinds of extra-written
agreements or understandings that may be set up. A defendant
may offer to show that the plaintiff breached certain inducing
promises so that he, defendant, should not be held for a breach of
the written agreement; that although he signed his name to a
particular agreement absolute on its face, the paper was not to
be enforced against him at all or unless certain contingencies happened, or possibly that it was to be used against him only in a
certain limited way. On the other hand a plaintiff may bring an
action for breach of an oral agreement made at the same time
as a written contract and having to do with the subject-matter
covered by the writing. In every one of these cases, the question
is raised as to whether the written contract is conclusive and exclusive or whether the rights and liabilities of the parties may be
changed by some alleged understanding dehors the writing which
extends, modifies, or nullifies a portion thereof.
It may be ventured that nearly all practitioners and judges in
this Commonwealth would say that on the trial of a case one may
always introduce testimony of oral promises or agreements made
or entered into contemporaneously with the execution of the writing and on the strength of which one of the parties signed the
writing. Indeed there are very few volumes of the State Supreme Court Reports that do not contain a sentence in substantially this language: "A contemporaneous parol agreement, on
the faith of which a written instrument was executed, may be
put into evidence even though it varies the terms of the writing."
In spite of the general impression and the oft-repeated language quoted, there are numerous decisions of the Supreme
Court, particularly since i88o, in which it is announced, at times
with apparent indignation, that evidence of the character under
consideration is inadmissible, especially if, as usually is the case,
it varies or extends the terms of the written agreement. The sentence, "The writing merges all prior negotiations and is presumed
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to contain the entire understanding between the parties regarding
the subject matter covered thereby," appears in these opinions,
but before the decision has made an impression on anyone other
than the surprised counsel involved, a statement, perhaps dictum,
of contrary import invariably appears.
The purpose of this paper is to point out the most recent decisions, particularly those that have flatly held the evidence inadmissible. It is the writer's opinion that the logical conclusion
to be drawn from recent decisions is that, in the absence of fraud,
accident or mistake, evidence of oral promises made contemporaneously with the execution of a written agreement, whether
sealed or not, is inadmissible even though such oral promises or
understandings are alleged to have induced the execution of the
writing. But the writer is equally convinced, in view of dicta in
many cases where the question has come up collaterally, that not
all members of our judiciary 9 realize how far the decisions have
gone in abolishing the "Pennsylvania exception" 10 to the parol
evidence rule. Whether the recent decisions conclusively indicate a change in the law is, for this reason and in the light of past
experience, beyond human prediction.
By far the most important recent case is Gianniv. Russell &
Co., Inc. 1 The action was by a lessee against his lessor for a
breach of contract. In the plaintiff's statement it was set forth
that he was in possession of a portion of an office building under
a lease for three years which contained the provision that lessee
should "use the premises only for the sale of fruit, candy, soda
water, etc." Plaintiff then declared that in the course of his
"Mr. Justice Walling, for example, persists in announcing the rule to be
this general statement: "A contemporaneous, oral agreement, on the faith of
which a written contract was executed, may be shown although it varies the
terms of the latter. Proof of the oral agreement, however, must be clear,
pecise and indubitable." See Moerlein Brewing Co. v. Rusch, 272 Pa. 181
(1922) ; Danish Pride Milk Products Co. v. Marcus et al., 272 Pa. 34o (1922);
Dixon v. Minogue, 276 Pa. 562 (1923); Humbert v. Meyers, 279 Pa. i71
(x4).
"In 52 AmERICAN L. REn., pages 6oz and 6o2, it is stated that Pennsylvania stands alone in failing to follow the strict English and Roman rule that
parol contemporaneous evidence is inadmissible to contradict or vary the terms
of a complete and unambiguous written instrument.
U 2 8 1 Pa. 32o.
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dealings with defendant's agent it was agreed that he should have
the exclusive right to sell soft drinks and soda water in the building. No such stipulation was contained in the written lease.
Some time after the execution of plaintiff's lease, defendant
leased.a portion of the same building to a drug store company
without restricting the latter's right to sell soda water and soft
drinks. It was for the violation, of the oral contract, which plaintiff alleged was the inducing cause of his signing the lease, that
the action was brought. In the lower court, although defendant
objected to the introduction of any evidence of the alleged oral
contract, plaintiff was permitted to show it and he recovered a
judgment from which defendant appealed. In an opinion by Mr.
Justice Schaffer, the appellate court 'eversed the lower court and
entered judgment for defendant. The reasons given for the decision are these:
i. Where parties, without any fraud or mistake, have put
their agreement in writing the law declares the writing to be not
only the best but the only evidence of their agreement. 12 Unless
fraud, accident or mistake be averred the writing constitutes the
sole agreement between the parties and its terms cannot be added
to or subtracted from by parol evidence.
2. Evidence of an oral, inducing agreement alleged to have
been made contemporaneously with a written contract is not admissible if the writing is the entire contract between the parties.
Whether or not the iriting is the entire contract will be determined by looking at the instrument itself; if it appears to be
"couched in such terms as to form a complete legal -obligation
without any mistake as to the object or extent of the instrument,
it is conclusively presumed that the whole engagement of the parties and the extent and manner of their undertaking were reduced
to writing."
nThe court found its authority for thii statement of the law in Martin
v. Berens, 67 Pa. 459 (1871), the pioneer case in disallowing any evidence of
an oral, contemporaneous agreement which contradicts the terms of the written
agreement. It should not be forgotten, however, that Williams, J., said in the
course of his short opinion: "Here there is no allegation . . .that the defendants were induced to execute the lease on the faith of the alleged oral agreement

case

.

.

.

"This

has been lost sight of in some subsequent citations of the
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3. The only exceptions to the parol evidence rule are in cases
of fraud, accident or mistake.
The opinion does not contain much in the way of discussion
of previous authorities, doubtless for the reason that the writer
realized the hopelessness and futility of any such review. In the
absence of an expressed repudiation of past decisions, only time
will tell whether the court will follow in opinions yet to be written the unqualified statement that the only exceptions to the parol
evidence rule are, as recognized everywhere, in cases of fraud,
accident or mistake.
The evidence which the Supreme Court held inadmissible
was that which was offered to prove the alleged oral agreement
whereby plaintiff was to have the exclusive right to sell soda
water. The purpose of this evidence was not to vary, extend,
modify, or contradict the lease between the parties and thereby
escape liability under it; the lease was not being sued upon. The
lease was in evidence, however, and it precluded, said the Supreme Court, any evidence of an oral, inducing agreement regarding plaintiff's rights not included within its terms and not
omitted therefrom as a result of fraud, accident or mistake. As
is pointed out later, many similar cases have arisen in which the
question presented has been as to whether the plaintiff could prove
the oral contract on which he had brought suit in view of the
fact that admittedly there was a written contract covering the
same subject-matter executed at the same time.
Twenty years ago a writer Istreating of the same subject
as is here being discussed developed the history of the "policy
adopted in this state at a very early period, and since steadfastly
adhered to, of excepting out of the operation of the English rule
excluding parol evidence to vary, contradict or alter a written
contract, cases where a contemporaneous parol promise is proposed to be shown, on the faith of which the contract was executed." That history might be briefly summarized as follows:
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, speaking through Chief
Justice M'Kean in Thompson v. White,14 held that evidence was
"1Mr. Stanley Folz in 52 AxEncm; L. REL 6oz (1904).
It1 Dall. 424 (x789).
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admissible to fasten a direct oral trust upon a land owner whose
deed was absolute on its face but which was executed and delivered in reliance upon a verbal promise to hold in trust for certain
named persons. In the language employed in that case 1 5 is said
to be found the source from which developed the rule that oral
agreements as to the use to which a written instrument might be
put may be proved in cases where such oral promises were contemporaneous with and induced the execution of the writing.
The court was taken with the argument and embodied the thought
in the opinion that to permit one to use a written instrument in
violation of his promise which induced the execution of the instrument would be to aid him in the perpetration of a fraud.
Chief Justice Tilghman became a champion of the "Pennsylvania
exception" to the English parol evidence rule and his statement
in Wallace v.Baker 16 of the early, unreported case of Hurs's
Lessees v. Kirkbride, decided in 1773, is often pointed to as the
very beginning of the broad rule announced in many later cases
that all inducing oral promises made at the execution of a written
instrument are admissible in evidence. Several later opinions of
the Supreme Court 1 7 were required, however, before the socalled Pennsylvania rule was thoroughly established. A cursory
reading of them is convincing that in formulating and encouraging the rule, the court had in mind the prevention of what they
2s"It has, indeed, been a general rule .
. that no parol proof shall be
admitted to contradict, add to, diminish, or vary from a deed or writing. But
it is certain that there are several exceptions to this rule, and many cases may
be found in which parol proof has been admitted, notwithstanding writings
have been signed between the parties. For instance, where a declaration is
made before a deed is executed, showing the design with which it was executed,
the decisions in the Court of Chancery have been grounded upon parol proof."
"t Binn. 6to (i8og).
'Christ v. Diffenbach, I S. & P. 464 (18is); Campbell v. McClenachan,
6 S. & P. 171 (i82o). The first case cited presents a rather typical set of

facts. In effect, a lessee attempted to avoid his liability to pay rent by showing the breach by his lessor of a promise to make certain repairs made just

prior to the execution of the lease and which was supposed to be included within

its terms but which was not so included upon lessor's inducing agreement to
make, the repairs within a specified time. The Supreme Court, in opinions by
Tilghman, C. J., and Yeates, J., reversed the lower court which had rejected
the evidence. The main ground of the decision was that the lessor was committing a fraud. "It is too late now," said Tilghman, "to consider, whether

more good or harm has resulted from the admission of such evidence in any

case of writing."
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branded or labeled as fraud. The soundness of the rule was,
during the next sixty years, practically unquestioned except in a
single decision.18
It was shortly after i88o that because of certain influences,
notably that parties in interest had been made competent wit.nesses, the Supreme Court began more and more to call attention to the danger in allowing written agreements to be overthrown by such evidence. The change in attitude consisted not so
much in excluding the evidence and thus observing the strict English rule, as in a closer supervision of the character and quantity
of evidence necessary to bring the case within the exception. In
several cases during this period, the court reaffirmed the rule that
written agreements might be modified or contradicted by parol
evidence but reversed the judgment of the lower court because the
oral agreement had not been established by evidence which could
be said to be dear, precise and indubitable. 19 There then appeared several cases in which the court refused to allow such evidence to affect the writing, laying emphasis on the fact that it was
a contract or agreement under seal that would be modified, extended or varied.20 These cases have led some to the conclusion
that evidence of oral inducing promises other than those which
defined the uses to which the instrument should be put may not
be admitted to vary or contradict the terms of sealed instruments.
It is submitted, however, that the language of the Supreme Court
when making special reference to sealed instruments was more
accidental than intentional and that there has never been any
serious effort made to distinguish in this subject between sealed
and parol instruments. 21 Certainly the court has never hesitated
"Martin v. Berens, 67 Pa. 459 (1871).
"Juniata Bldg. Assn. -. Hetzel, IO3 Pa. 507 (1883); Thomas v. Loose,

The same
114 Pa. 35 (1886); Cullmans v. Lindsay, 114 Pa. i66 (x886).
tendency is noticeable in more recent cases, i. e., the tendency to put the decision
on the ground that the evidence of an alleged oral agreement was not clearly,
precisely and indubitably proved. Thompson v. Schoch, 254 Pa. 585 (i9i6);
Pittsburgh-Texas Gas & Oil Co. v. Adams, 79 Pa. Super. 5IX (1922); Neville
v. Kretzschmar, 27x Pa. 2 (iga); Dixon v. Minogue, 276 Pa. 562 (x923).
sEberle v. Bonafon's Executors, 17 W. N. C. 335 (i886).; Irvin v. Irvin,
142 Pa. 271 (i8gi); Wodock v. Robinson, 148 Pa. 5o3 (1892).

' It is true that in some respects at least the rules regarding the varying
of sealed instruments by parol evidence are more strict than in the case of
simple instruments. Thus, although the terms of a simple contract may be so

-
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to cite cases involving instruments under seal when dealing with
parol'instruments and vice versma. 22

The principle laid down in

the cases involving sealed instruments, whether purposely or accidentally, was taken over into cases involving parol instruments. 23 The preliminary step consisted of very definite statements in a number of opinions 2 4 that the violation of an oral
contemporaneous agreement or promise to do something in the
future is not fraud within the meaning of the phrase "fraud, accident or mistake." With the dissolution of this theory as to
fraud disappeared the main reason ever given for admitting such
evidence.
After thus showing the progress of the rule, going through
the steps in which there was an increasing tendency on the part of
the Supreme Court toward the exclusion of the evidence, starting with th6 case of Martin v. Beren.s 2 5 and evident particularly
in cases of writings involving written contracts under seal, the
writer of the earlier article on this subject came to certain conclusions. These were that, as a result oi several decisions then recent, the broad class 26 of oral contemporaneous inducing promchanged by parol as to render liable one not on its face a party to it by showing that he was an undisclosed principal, this does not apply to sealed instruments. See MECHE, AGmcy (2nd ed. 1914), § 1729 et seq. and 22 C. J. 1234
It does not follow from this, however, that one sued even on a simple contract
may set up that he acted only as agent for another. This cannot be done in
the absence of fraud, accident or mistake. Crelier v. Mackey, 243 Pa. 363
1914 .. And, likewise, in .the case of a lease. Hamilton v. Fleck, 249 Pa. 607
.1915
"In a Superior Court case, for example, Zillic v. Minnich, 67 Pa. Super.
Ia (1917), evidence of a contemporaneous oral inducing agreement was admitted, with the result that the sealed instrument was practically destroyed.
The report is very brief but indicates that that tribunal drew no distinction
between a sealed and an unsealed instrument in this subject of parol evidence.
'In Dixon-Woods Co. v. Phillips Glass Co., 169 Pa. I67 (1895); Union
Storage Co. v. Speck, 194 Pa. 126 (i8q)

; Fuller v. Law, 207 Pa. 1ox (1go3):

" rn addition to the cases cited in Notes 2o and 23, supra, see Krueger v.
Nicola, 205 Pa. 38 (i9o3). For a criticism of the "Pennsylvania Doctrine of
Fraud," see 5 WIGMORE, EvIDmCc, 311. The theory may now, be said to have
been exploded. See Gianni v. Russell & Co., Inc., 281 Pa. 32o (1924) ; Phila.
& Gulf S. S. Co. v. Pechin, 61 Pa. Super. 401 (i9x5).

m67 Pa. 459 (1871).
Mr. Folz divided the Pennsylvania cases into two classes: i. The broad
class represented by Greenawalt v. Kohne, 85 Pa. 369 (1877), and Juniata B.
& L. Assn. v. Hetzel, 103 Pa. 5o7 (1883), wherein the rule was stated, in
effect, that parol evidence is admissible to show any verbal contemporaneous
agreement which induced the execution of a written obligation, though it may
vary or change the terms of the written instrument. 2. The narrower class

244

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

ises was no longer admissible but that the courts still maintained
the narrow rule that when the oral promise or undertaking relates to and defines the use to which the instrument may be put
the eviderxce is admissible. These conclusions were perfectly justified in view of the decisions cited which seemed to indicate a
complete change in attitude on the part of our Supreme Court.
It will be interesting to note a few of the outstanding cases since
the date of that article and to see whether the change in attitude
persisted; if it did, it might be said that the Gianni case merely
follows along what has been the general tendency since the beginning of this century.
A review of the cases will show rather conclusively, however, that the Supreme Court was not impressed as was the writer
of the article referred to above, with the significance of some of
its decisions. 2 7 Within a few years after the article was written,
decisions appeared in which the court in turn sanctioned the admission of practically any kind of evidence of oral inducing
agreements, detfied its admissibility or insisted on a high. degree
of proof as the exigency of the particular case seemed to require.
There are now so many authorities for any one of these positions
that when a court takes one view it merely has to cite the authorities which sustain that position and say nothing of the others.
We find many dicta in all of the cases on this subject and to come
to any conclusions at all would be hopeless, were we not to confine ourselves as much as possible to the facts of each case.
In 1912 an interesting case 28 came before the Supreme
Court and in ascertaining from it the attitude of the court at that
date, we shall look not only at the actual decision but also at the
which developed first and which is authority for the proposition that parol
evidence is admissible to affect written instruments where there has been an
attempt to make a use of the instrument contrary to a promise or agreement
made contemporaneously with the writing and without which the written instrumentT would not have been signed.
It is clear that the Superior Court did not think the law had been
changed. In Yinger v. Youngman, 30 Pa. Super. x39 (i9o6), counsel called
the court's attention to the recent Supreme Court cases, but President Judge
Rice's reply was, "They cannot be said to overturn the rule recognized and
applied in a multitude of Pennsylvania decisions, that parol evidence is admissible of a contemporaneous oral agreement which induced the execution of a
written contract, though it may vary, change or reform the instrument . . . "
SCroyle v. Cambria Land & Improvement Co., Ltd., 233 Pa. 311 (1912).
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discussion by the court. The plaintiff executed and delivered to
defendant company a deed of release for a right-of-way over his
land. After the deed of release was offered in evidence the plaintiff offered to prove a parol agreement made by defendant's agent
at the time of the execution of the deed that the low land on each
side of the road to be constructed by defendant over the right-of29
way should be filled in so as to bring it to a level with the road.
It was for breach of this agreement alleged to have been made,
but not included in the deed that the plaintiff brought his action,
seeking damages. The offer was objected to and its admission
by the court was the main issue before the Supreme Court. It
will be noticed at once that what the plaintiff was trying to do
was to set up that he was to receive an additional consideration
for his release. He was not trying to avoid his deed on the
ground of failure of consideration but was attempting to recover
damages for the breach of the alleged parol agreement. In this
respect, he was attempting to do exactly the same thing that the
plaintiff in the Gianni case tried to do. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the lower court expressly on the ground
that Pennsylvania has always allowed evidence of oral, conterpporaneous, inducing promises. Mr. Justice Stewart said:
"No case could better illustrate the wisdom of the policy adopted in this state at a very early period, and since
steadfastly adhered to, of excepting out of the operation
of the English rule excluding parol evidence to vary, contradict, or alter a written contract, cases where a contemporaneous parol promise is proposed to be shown, on the
faith of which the contract was executed. Here was found
no fraud in connection with the execution of the contract
to be relieved against. . . . The*English rule in its strictness would exclude all evidence of the promise, notwithstanding a subsequent refusal by defendant to observe its
promise, while holding on to what it obtained by reason of it,
which] would be quite as much a fraud on the plaintiff as
any willful suppression or misrepresentation of fact in conThere was also evidence that this additional agreement by defendant was
supposed to have been inserted in the writing, that plaintiff refused to sign
when the instrument was presented to him without it and that he finally did
sign after defendant's agent promised the land would be filled in if plaintiff
signed.
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nection with the-making of the instrument; . . . It was
this manifest inadequacy of the rule to work out equitable
results in just such case as we have here that prevailed with
our courts to except such cases out of its operation. And
so we have it settled in Pennsylvania, beyond all dispute,
'that where at the execution of a writing a stipulation has
been entered into, a condition annexed, or a promise made
by word of mouth, upon the faith of which the writing has
been executed, parol evidence is admissible, though it may
vary and materially change the terms of the contract.'"
The opinion then concludes with the statement that "a recent very thorough discussion of this subject by our Brother
BRowN in the case of Gandy v. Weckerly, 220 Pa. 285, makes
further comment here unnecessary." In referring to that case
and indeed depending largely on it, the Supreme* Court made
clear that it drew no distinction between cases involving the admission of oral contemporaneous inducing promises generally and
those involving the violation of a contemporaneous promise concerning the use to which the written instrument would be put. 0
It was pointed out that the opinion in the above case was
written by Mr. Justice Stewart. Let us now turn to another opinion written by the same Justice a year later."1 The plaintiff and
defendant entered into written articles of agreement for the exchange of one of two properties owned by the plaintiff for one
owned by defendant on certain specified terms. The defendant
company was to convey its lot, subject to a mortgage, for a cash
consideration and plaintiff was to convey also subject to a mortgage and for a cash consideration. Plaintiff owned another lot
in the City of Philadelphia; both of her lots were bound by one
mortgage which was, subsequent to the exchange, foreclosed,
and the lot retained by her as well as the one given in the exchange was sold under the foreclosure proceedings. The plaintiff
suffered a loss and brought this suit for breach of an oral contract alleged by her to have been made contemporaneously with
the written contract of exchange to the effect that defendant was
"See Note 26, supra.
'Becker v. Second Active Building Assoc.,
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to have the mortgage which incumbered both her properties released as to the one she retained. The offer was to show that the
plaintiff was induced to sign the written agreement of exchange
because of this alleged agreement. The court below sustained
the objection to the offer and the plaintiff appealed. Mr. Justice Stewart wrote:
It
"This appeal has nothing to support it. . .
ought not to be necessary to repeat so frequently the rule
that all prior agreements, verbal or written, become merged
in-the sealed instrument which is the final result of the bargaining, and which can neither be added to nor subtracted
from by parol evidence, except as fraud, accident or mistake be shown. While the offer in this case was to show a
parol agreement for additional consideration to that expressed in the written contract, it suggests no explanation of
the fact that the written contract is silent as to such additional consideration. It is nowhere averred that it was omitted through fraud, accident or mistake. The plaintiff knew,
or should have known, when she signed the written contract,
that it contained no covenant that defendant would cause her
remaining property to be released from the lien of the mortgage; she did not ask to have such covenants inserted, but
relied wholly upon the oral promise which she says defendant had made that it would secure such release."
The prior opinion of Mr. Justice Stewart was, of course,
strongly urged upon .the court as controlling, but he apparently
had little difficulty in distinguishing it.
"The offer was not to prove that defendant made the
promise the plaintiff now sets up in order to induce her to
sign a written contract from which the covenant had been
omitted inadvertently or otherwise as was the case in Croyle
v. Cambria Land & Imp. Co., 233 Pa. 31, which appellant
thinks so much resembles this, but simply that in signing the
written contract which did not -express the entire consideration she understood she was to receive, she had in mind defendant's promise, and that this circumstance induced her
action.
"A more careful examination of the case referred to
would have made the distinction apparent between that case
and this. There the oral agreement which was set up had
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been inadvertently omitted from the written agreement.
when discovered by the party to be prejudiced by the omission he at once declined to execute it. To avoid the delay
that would be necessary, were another contract to be written, and [to] induce the party to execute it as written, the
other contracting party promised that if 4e signed as written what had been agreed upon orally and by mistake had
been omitted should be faithfully performed. On the
strength of this promise, the contract there was executed.
The offer in the present case was simply to show a contemporaneous oral contract, the omission of which from the
written contract did not influence the plaintiff one way or
other in respect to the execution of the latter, and under rules
which admit of no controversy, it was properly rejected."
The opinion of Mr. Justice Stewart in the Croyle case was
not so restricted in its application in a still later case while he was
still a member of the Bench, the opinion in which was written by
Mr. Chief Justice Brown. In Potter v. Grimm 32 plaintiff and
defendant entered into an agreement for the sale of the former's
farm. The purchase price fixed in the agreement was $2ooo. At
the date for settlement defendant tendered $2ooo and demanded
the delivery of the deed. Plaintiff then instituted suit for $2500
and alleged there was an oral contemporaneous inducing promise
that the purchase price was in fact to be $3000 and that defendant
promised to pay so much of the extra $iooo as plaintiff did not recover in damages from the county for the opening of a road
through her farm. It was set out that plaintiff recovered $5oo
damages and the balance due from defendant was, therefore,
$2500. In the lower court plaintiff recovered judgment for the
full amount and the Supreme Court affirmed. Chief Justice
Brown seems to take for granted that there should be no doubt
as to plaintiff's right to show the oral inducing agreement. The
opinion states:
"If the case were one in which the plaintiff was seeking to recover on the ground that the parol agreement had
been omitted from the written contract by fraud, accident
or mistake, counsel for appellant might well contend that the
=248 Pa. 44o (r915).
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appellee was bound by her written agreement, but such is not
the case as presented by her in the court below. The parol
agreement was not omitted from the written one by fraud,
. The case as made out by the
accident or mistake.
plaintiff was one in which a material matter inducing her
to sign the agreement had been omited from it, in pursuance
of an understanding between her and the vendee.
That the appellant cannot now commit a fraud upon the appellee by attempting to use the written agreement in violation of the parol contemporaneous promise which induced
her to sign the writing is well settled by a long line of cases."
The court states, apparently with some irritation, as though there
were absolutely no authorities to the contrary. "It seems that
we must again announce the rule laid down in the foregoing and
many other cases." The rule then announced is that:
"From Hurst's Lessee v. Kirkbride, decided in 1773,
and referred to by Tilghman, C. J., in Wallace v. Baker, i
Binney 6Io, this court has, through all the intervening years,
uniformly held that parol evidence is admissible to show a
verbal contemporaneous agreement, upon the faith of which
a written instrument- was executed even though such evidence may vary or change the terms of the same."
The authority mainly relied on was Stewart's opinion in Croyle
v. Cambria Land & Improvement Company, even though it was
admitted that the oral agreement was not "inadvertently" omitted. Indeed the very basis of the decision is, apparently, that the
alleged agreement was purposely omitted from the writing and
hence must be permitted to be shown to prevent fraud.
Two interesting features of this case (Potter i,.Grimm)
remain to be noted. One of the leading cases in"Pennsylvania for
the proposition that evidence of oral contemporaneous inducing
promises is not admissible to vary, extend, modify or contradict
the terms of a sealed instrument is Irvin v. Irvin.3 Concerning
this case Mr. Chief Justice Brown said:
"As counsel for appellant seem to place much reliance
upon an utterance of Mr. Chief Justice Paxson in Irvin v.
x42

Pa. 271 (x8gi).
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Irvin, 142 Pa. 271, it is sufficient to observe that what was
there said must be regarded as applicable to the -facts in that
case. In the long line of our cases uniformly holding that
it was competent to show that a parol contemporaneous
agreement was the inducement to the execution of the written one, the omission of the former from the latter was,
as a rule, to all intents and purposes the deliberate act of the
parties."P

This leads us to wonder whether the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania will in some later case directly raising the point, make an
effort to distinguish or "confine to its facts," or totally ignore the
clear opinion of Mr. Justice Schaffer in Gianni v. Russell & Co.
The other interesting feature of the Potter v. Grimm case
is that Mr. Justice Stewart dissented, it being his opinion the
evidence was inadmissible. His dissent is based mainly on the
84
authority of Irvin v. Irin.
The other ground for his dissent is the distinction which he
had used before,85 viz., that nothing was omitted from the written contract that was ever intended to be inserted in it, whereas
in the Croyle case the parties really intended that the oral agreement should be included although it actually was not included
and both parties had knowledge of its omission. Although this
distinction has not been used by the Supreme Court, it might be
wise to pause a moment to test its validity. Mr. Justice Stewart
was of the opinion that there was sufficient difference in the two
following illustrations to warrant admitting evidence of the oral
promise or agreement in the first and rejecting it altogether in the
second. i. A and B come to certain terms and agree to commit their contract to writing. The contract is prepared but one
of the terms is omitted. A reads it over, discovers the omission
and refuses to sign. B says: "Time is short. You sign; I promise to perform that term." A, induced, thereupon signs. 2. A
enters into a written contract with B as a result of B's promise to
" It is difficult to tell whether Justice Stewart relied on Irvin v. Irvin
because it involved a sealed instrument or because of its statement, which he
quotes: "When parties without fraud or mistake have put their engagements
in writing, that is not only the best, but the sole evidence of their agreement."
"In Becker v. Second Active Bldg. Assoc., a39 Pa. 590 (1913).
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do something which is not in the writing, there never having been
any talk of putting it in.
The first illustration is more clearly the case of a statement
made to induce the execution of the writing but the difference
is one more of degree than of substance. A, in the first illustration, was more careful than A in the second illustration, in that
he asked to have the promise included in the writing, but he was
not careful enough since he signed knowing it was not included.
He is not entitled to protection any more in the first instance than
in the second. The distinction as drawn is, it is submitted, unsupportable by sound legal reasoning and does not offer a logical test to determine the admissibility of evidence of an oral
agreement which would affect a written instrument.
In one particular the three cases which have been discussed
thus far and the Gianzi case are similar. In each the action was
brought to recover damages for breach, not of the written contract, but of an oral, inducing agreement, alleged to have been
made contemporaneously with it. In none of the cases was the
rule discussed that the parol evidence rule is inapplicable where
the writing is not sued upon, but is only collaterally in issue. In
the Gianni case the argument was presented that no endeavor was
being made to extend or modify the written instrument but that
the action was for the breach of an independent oral agreement.
The court in the other cases does not seem to have considered this
proposition but in the recent case it was considered and not allowed to prevail for the reason that the subject-matter covered
by the alleged independent oral agreement was identical with
that of the written agreement and in such case the court said the
writing was to be taken as the only agreement:
"When does the oral agreement come within the field
enbraced by the written one? This can be answered by
comparing the two, and determining whether parties, situated as were the ones to the contract, would naturally and
normally include the one in the other if it were made. If.
they relate to the same subject-matter and are so interrelated
that both would be executed at the same time, and in the
same contract, the scope of the subsidiary agreement must
be taken to be covered by the writing.. This question must
be determined by the court."
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This is the test recommended by Professor Williston 36 for
determining whether an oral agreement is so far separate and
collateral from and to the writing as to be admissible in evidence.
It is a test which can and should be used to advantage whenever
evidence of alleged oral, contemporaneous, inducing agreements
is offered.
The nature of the written instrument involved apparently
has never made any difference in the application of legal principles under the parol evidence rule and exceptions thereto but,
for purposes of convenience, it may be best to classify the cases
according to the written instrument which is sought to be affected
by evidence of oral inducing promises.
CONTRACTS

In addition to the decisions of the Supreme Court already
referred to, it may be worth, while to mention additional cases
involving ordinary contracts for the purpose of ascertaining what
kind of evidence the courts have admitted and what they have rejected. In an action 8 T by a manufacturer against a purchaser
for the latter's refusal to accept ordered goods, an offer was
made to show an oral, contemporaneous, inducing agreement
that work on the goods was not to be commenced until notice
should be given by defendants and until defendants had furnished
certain drawings. The lower court sustained the objection to the
offer solely on the ground that there was in the written contract
a provision that the terms were not to be modified by any agreement not in writing. The Supreme Court affirmed the action of
the lower court but gave as its principal reason the statement
that "while a contemporaneous oral agreement which is entered
into as an inducement to the execution of a written agreement,
and not inconsistent with it, may be shown in defense to a suit
upon a written contract, Keller v. Cohen, 217 Pa. 522; yet in the
present case the agreement which it was attempted to set up is
clearly inconsistent with the written contract." This is still an"In his work on Contracts (ig2o) Vol. 2, § 638.
"Ridgeway D. & E. Co. v. Penna. Cement Co., 221 Pa. i6o (rgo8).
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other test as to the admissibility of parol evidence, found in a
few cases, but not generally adopted. While the Supreme Court
has discountenanced parol evidence that would entirely destroy
a written contract, it has not generally held that 8 such evidence
Indeed the
cannot be introduced if it is merely inconsistent.
the evithat
fact
the
in
basis
very
its
"Pennsylvania Rule" has
writthe
with
consistent
dence is admissible even though it is not
ing.
39
In a case two years later, the plaintiff brought an action of
assumpsit alleging violation of an oral contemporaneous agreement, said to have been made contemporaneously with a written
building contract, that the building was to be of a certain tensile
strength. The court below entered a compulsory nonsuit on the
ground that the plaintiff could not Set up the oral agreement
since the written contract was not vague or incomplete. The Supreme Court affirmed in a per curiam opinion.
0
There is a recent decision 4 which might be said to be exasperating to one who is familiar with the doubt that has been in
the minds of the Supreme Court as to the admissibility of the
kind of evidence here under consideration, to say nothing of the
numerous cases in which the court has flatly said it is inadmissible. The report shows merely that defendants gave plaintiff "a
written order" for a certain quantity of milk. The defendants
sold only a small part of it and returned the remainder, paying
only for the part sold. When sued for the balance of the purchase price, defendants offered to set up an oral agreement, which
they avowed led them to give the order, that plaintiff Would take
back such of the milk as they were unable to sell. The trial court
rejected the offer but had its efforts to follow many Supreme
Court cases rewarded by a reversal. After reciting the fact that
the lower court rejected the offer, Mr. Justice Walling summar"Wigmore criticizes this test as reasoning in a circle, "for it is an attempt
whether something conceded to be different from the writing ought
decide
to
to be excluded, by showing that it is different." 5 WIG oaE, EViDENCE, 309.
"Wallace v. Steele, 228 Pa. 70 (9i).
(1922). For
'Danish Pride Milk Products Co. v. Marcus, 272 Pa. 34o see
2 WrLLISconclusion,
opposite
an
reached
which
jurisdictions
cases in other
(1920).
25
I.
1240,
TON, CoNTRActs,
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ily disposes of the question by saying: "This was error. A contemporaneous oral agreement, on the faith of which a written
contract was executed, may be shown although it varies the terms
of the latter."
It is apparent how hopeless the situation is while the Supreme Court of the Commonwealth continues in an unqualified,
matter-of-fact manner to announce as the law a rule that has
been limited, repudiated, and even denounced time and time again.
The decision might well have been put on the ground that the
parol evidence rule did not apply since the "written order" was
manifestly not the entire contract between the parties, for it was
nothing more than an order, as an examination of the record
has disclosed. Instead, however, the well known, though much
buffeted rule was dragged forth for the occasion.
In Noel v. Kessler,4 1 the plaintiff declared in assumpsit on
written and oral contracts. It seems that he had entered into a
written contract with defendants for the hauling of some lumber
and that at the same time, according to plaintiff's statement,
there was an oral agreement that he would not be required to
sort and stack the lumber, which would be done by defendant's
millman. This he followed by a statement that the millman, having failed to sort and stack, ihe plaintiff did that also upon defendant's oral promise to pay him. Evidence as to the parol
agreement that plaintiff would not be required to sort and stack
the lumber was objected to but was admitted. The Supreme
Court, in affirming, stated: "In fact, the evidence did not tend to
contradict or vary the written contract which made no provision
for sorting or stacking the lumber. It is settled by our decisions,
however, that parol evidence is admissible to show that at the execution of a written instrument a stipulation was entered into,'a
condition annexed, or a verbal promise made upon the faith Qf
which the writing was executed, though it may vary or materially
change the terms of the contract."
In Evans v. Edelstein,42 the written articles of agreement
for the sale of certain real estate provided that the hand money
"252 Pa. 244 (1916).

"276 Pa. 5x6 (1ga3).
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was to be forfeited in the event the purchaser did not go through
with the transaction. In an action by the purchaser to recover
the hand money paid, he attempted to set up an oral contemporaneous inducing agreement that if, for any reason, he should
thereafter be unable to comply with the terms of the undertaking
the hand money would be returned to him. After a verdict for
plaintiff the court entered judgment n. o. v. for defendant and the
Supreme Court affirmed apparently on the sole ground that:
"The effect of the parol agreement would be not to
modify but to nullify the contract. . . . To sustain such
a position as that assumed by appellant would be to end the
integrity of contracts in writing, and in effect to decide what
is set up in parol in contravention of them is superior in
probative force to that which the parties penned as their
agreement, and solemnly signed."
In an opinion by Mr. Justice Simpson, 48 although actually
deciding only that where admittedly a written instrument does
not contain the whole of the contract between, the parties oral
may be shown, there is an interestcontemporaneous agreements
4
ing statement of the law: 4
"It is true a party who sets up a contemporaneous parol
agreement, varying the terms of a written instrument sued
or defended upon, has a heavy burden to carry, and must
aver any alleged omission was the result of fraud, accident
or mistake; but it is equally true no such requirement exists
where the attempt is to use the writing in violation of a collateral promise whereby the party's signature was obtained
to the instrument: Gandy v. Weckerly, 220 Pa. 285; Noel v.
Kessler, 252 Pa. 244."

There is a legal presumption recognized even by the Pennsylvania courts that, where parties put their contract into writ"Federal Sales Co. of Phila. v. Farrell, 264 Pa. 149 (xgg).
"It seems to recognize as the only exception to the rule that evidence of
a contemporaneous, oral agreement not omitted through fraud, accident or
mistake is inadmissible the case in which there is an attempt to use the writing
in violation of a collateral, inducing promise. The Superior Court, in a case
involving a contract, recognized the same exception in the case of a promise
anent the use to which the instrument might be put. Winters v. Schmitz, 36 Pa.
Super. 496 (s9o8).

-
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ing "couched in such terms as to form a complete legal obligation," the writing contains the entire agreement between the parties. This presumption, as we have seen, has not been able, in
most cases, to stand up against an offer to prove an oral, contemporaneous agreement which induced the written contract's
execution. Can the parties protect themselves against such evidence by an express provision in the contract that the entire agreement is contained therein and that no verbal or other outside representation will be recognized? Despite an intimation to the
contrary in a late case,4 5 a definite answer can be given in the
affirmative for in the face of such a provision the courts have
46
refused to hear evidence even of the favored inducing promises.
The most recent decision of the Supreme Court (Hauer v. Martin, November 23, 1925, as yet unreported), probably sets at rest

any question in this direction, dearly stating that in the absence
of an allegation of fraud, accident or mistake a clause in a written contract precluding unsigned and verbal stipulations or agreements is controlling. But the provision against verbal agreements
47
Court,
must, it would appear from a decision by the Superior

be incorporated in the body of the contract; it is not sufficient
that it appear printed in the margin of the paper.
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS

Some of the most interesting and difficult questions surrounding this subject have arisen in cases involving bills and
promissory notes. When should the maker of a bill or note containing an absolute and unconditional promise to pay be permitted to change the nature of that promise by introducing evidence of an oral promise made just before he affixed his name to
it and without which he would not have signed? The Supreme
"Tate-Jones & Co., Inc. v. Union Electric Steel Co., 281 Pa. 448, 454
(1924).

"Gross v. Exeter Machine Works, Inc., 277 Pa. 363 (1923); Otto Gas
Eng. Works v. Pepper, 228 Pa. 205 (Igio); Meyercord Co. v. Gwillian Mfg.
Co., 85 Pa. Super. 33 (1925); Holcomb & Hoke Mfg. Co. v. Gamba, 8o Pa.
Super. 191 (1922) ; Colt Co. v. Evans, 74 Pa. Super. 73 (1920) ; Tranter Mfg.
Co. v. Blaney, 61 Pa. Super. 379 (1915); Phila. & Gulf S. S. Co. v. Pechin,
; Guernsey v. Moon, 46 Pa. Super. 645 (191).
61 Pa. Super. 401 (i5)
" Outcalt Adv. Co. v. Ritchey, 63 Pa. Super. 597 (1916).
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Court has said that evidence is admissible of an oral, contemporaneous, inducing promise as to the use to which an instrument
will be put in order to prevent a "fraudulent use" of it. The
Supreme Court has also said it will not permit a written contract
to be nullified by evidence of an oral understanding. These policies or decisions have clashed in the case of negotiable instruments, although not apparent from a reading of any one opinion.
At the outset, attention should be called to several rules regarding delivery of negotiable instruments that appear to be
well settled. Under the Negotiable Instruments Act, 48 except
in the case of a holder in due course, the delivery of a negotiable
instrument may be shown to have been conditional or for a special purpose only. Parol evidence is admissible, therefore, to establish such delivery as well as to show that there was no delivery.49 The parol evidence rule has no application where the offer is to show there was no delivery, for delivery is essential to
the contractual relation in bills and notes and there must be a
contract before the rule applies. It is a general principle that it
may be shown that a writing never became effective. 50
An outstanding case during the past twenty years under this
heading is that of Gandy v. Weckerly,5 1 in which an action of
assumpsit was brought on a promissory note, payable absolutely
within one year after date. The affidavit of defense set up that
defendant was asked by plaintiff to lend money to a certain corporation and to take the corporation's note, and that after so doing it was agreed that plaintiff would sell defendant some stock
in the corporation, taking his note for it, which note defendant
would not be called upon to pay except out of money received
from the company in payment of its note. Judgment for want
of a sufficient affidavit of defense was entered by the lower court
bAct of May i6, Igoi, P. L. 194, Section i6. See Vosburgh's Estate, 279
Pa. 329 (924); Liab v. Kozuhowski, 53 Pa. Super. 5o (0913).
Cases cited in I JOYCE, DEFENSES TO COMMERCIAL PAPER (2nd ed. 1924),
§ 486 et seq.; BRANNAN'S NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW (3rd ed. 1920), 60; 5
Uniform Laws Annotated, 84. See also 72 U. OF PA. L. REV. 319 (1924).
' Wr.LusToN, CONRACTS, Vol. 2, § 634. This is true in England. A lecture by Patrick Hastings, K. C., entitled "Parol Evidence in Connection With
Written Contracts," is to be found in 148 Law Times 223 (Eng., i919).
R22o Pa. 285 (19o8).
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and affirmed by the Superior Court on the authority of such cases
as Fuller v. Law.52 The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Mr.
Justice Brown, reversed. Two reasons were given for the decision. First, evidence of a broken promise which induces one
to sign an obligation and without which he would not have signed
it is always admissible. The cases relied on by the Superior Court
were distinguished on the ground that in them the inducement
feature of the promise was not directly involved. Secondly, if
one by suing on a note "attempts to exact payment from the
maker in violation of a promise, without which the note would
not have been given, he is guilty of a fraud, against which the
maker may defend."
The case was argued before a full bench and the opinion, so
far as can be ascertained from the report, was concurred in by all
seven justices. The case has since been cited for the proposition
that evidence is admissible to show an oral agreement that a note
is to be paid out of a particular fund but the reasons given in the
preceding paragraph are the sole ones given in the opinidn.
The oral agreement proved in the Gandy case had the effect
of possibly, at least, nullifying the instrument since it was possible that the other note would never be paid. Aside from the
actual decision, it is surprising to read the statement by Chief
Justice Brown that the breach of the oral promise was fraud.
One would have supposed this erroneous idea had been dispelled
long before 19o8. Several opinions by the Supreme Court had
appeared in which was repudiated the statement made in earlier
cases that the breach of an agreement as to the use to which the
instrument would be put in the future or the breach of any agreement as to future conduct of the parties amounted to such fraud
as to make admissible evidence of the oral promise. 53 One is led
to ask whether the very distinct statement made in a recent Supreme Court opinion will likewise be lost sight of in the future.
"Appellee seeks to take himself out of the rule forbidding evidence of a verbal agreement by alleging fraud. The promise
not to use the judgment note, and the subsequent delivery of it,
52207

Pa.',IoI

(1903).

See Nbe 24, supra.

PENNA. RULE AS TO ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE

259

do not constitute fraud within the legal meaning of that word.
Despite what was said in earlier Pennsylvania cases, it has been
stated, and we now repeat, that a breach of faith or of an agreement regarding the doing or refraining from doing something in
the future is not fraud, as that word is employed in the phrase
'fraud, accident or mistake.'"
In connection with the rule that evidence of an oral promise
is always admissible to prevent a so-called fraudulent use of an
instrument, the recent case from which the above quotation was
taken is pertinent In First National Bank of Hooversville v.
Sagerson, et al.,54 an issue was framed to determine the validity
of certain judgments on judgment notes. The main facts set
forth in the petition to open the judgments were that the maker
was induced to sign them by promises that he would not be bound
by them, that his giving of the notes was only a temporary arrangement, a mere matter of form, and they would not be used
against him. Despite these alleged oral promises, without which
the maker would not have signed, the judgment notes were entered up. It is difficult to imagine a clearer case of a "fraudulent use" of written instruments. The lower court opened the
judgments but the Supreme Court reversed and the judgments
were reinstated. The main reason given by the court was that
the evidence of the oral agreement was altogether inadmissible
since it had the effect of rendering the judgment notes mere nullities.
One of the cases cited in support of the decision is Second
National Bank of Reading v. Yeager,5" in which the maker of a
promissory note attempted to set up an oral understanding
whereby he was not to be liable unless one of the joint makers
was unable to repay plaintiff a certain sum of money and even in
default of such payment he was not to be liable until a certain
event happened, which had not as yet occurred. The Supreme
Court affirmed the action of the lower court in entering a summary judgment for want of a sufficient affidavit of defense expressly on the ground that the agreement had the effect of de283 Pa. 406
"268 Pa. 167

(1925).
(zi9o).
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stroying the instrument. It is to be noted, however, that there
was a possibility even under the oral agreement that the maker
would have been liable so that the instrument was not rendered
an absolute nullity any more than it was in Gandy v. Weckerly.
It is difficult to understand why there should be a difference
between admitting evidence which has the effect of rendering
the instrument a nullity and admitting evidence which changes
materially the terms of the writing, other than that it is more
likely that persons would agree to a modification of an agreement put in writing than that they would deliberately put an agreement in writing and at the same time have an oral understanding
that it was to be of no effect. It would not seem that the effect
of admitting certain testimony should determine its admissibility.
The legal principles which exclude, in the absence of fraud, accident or mistake, testimony the effect of which is to destroy the
written instrument involved apply with equal force to all testimony of any matters dehors the writing having to do with the
same subject-matter, whether the effect of admitting it is to destroy, contradict, modify or exend the terms of the writing. The
courts have undoubtedly had these legal principles in mind in
coming to their decision but they have on frequent occasions in
the written opinion assigned as the only reason for excluding the
evidence the fact that if admitted it would destroy or contradict
the writing,50 or for admitting it that it would not contradict
7
anything in the writing.5
If the identical situation that was presented to the court in
Gandy v. Weckerly should again arise it would be interesting to
see what the Supreme Court would do. It is scarcely conceivable
that the court would decide the case the same way on the ground
that the parol evidence was admissible to show that payment was
to be made out of a particular fund. It is submitted that the two
later cases referred to above should have the effect of changing
"See First National of Pittston v. Lawall, 280 Pa. 407 (1924). In Homewood Peoples Bank v. Heckert, 207 Pa. 231 (i9o3), a defense very similar
to that interposed in the Gandy case was held ineffective as flatly contradicting
the written instrument. A similar defense in Thompson, Receiver, v. Schoch,
254 Pa. 585 (i9x6), failed only because it was not clearly and indubitably
proved.
'5 Yinger v. Youngman, 30 Pa. Super. 139 (i9o6), which involved a lease.
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the rule as laid down by Chief Justice Brown. There can be no
question but that the second reason given by the former Chief
Justice would not prevail, namely, that the use of a note in violation of a promise made at the time of its execution amounts to
fraud and it would seem to be equally certain under the later
cases that it is not sufficient, in order to render admissible evidence of an oral contemporaneous promise, to aver that it was
the inducement which led to the execution of the note.
The most recent decision of the Supreme Court (First National Bank of Donora ,. Purcell, handed down November 23,
1925, as yet unreported), is another departure from Gandy v.
Weckerly. When sued on his note, regular on its face, the defendant set up that he signed under the following circumstances:
He and two associates were about to form a corporation. They
needed money to purchase a valuable asset for the corporation
and so borrowed the money from the plaintiff, defendant signing
the note. He averred that he was induced to sign the note by the
contemporaneous agreement by the vice-president of plaintiff
bank, that as soon as the corporation was created its note would be
substituted for defendant's note and defendant discharged from
individual liability. The lower court, citing the Gandy case. permitted the defense. The Supreme Court reversed, saying: "The
court below should have declared the attempted defense to be unavailing as a matter of law and directed a verdict for plaintiff; a
failure to do so was manifest error."
The recent cases discussed ought to make it clear that negotiable instruments cannot be destroyed by testimony of "inducing agreements."
LEASES

The same diversity of decisions is to be found in cases involving this class of instruments and the fact that they are under
seal has seemed to play no part in the result. There is a comparatively recent example of just how far the courts will go in admitting evidence of oral agreements in order to do what they conceive to be equity. An action was brought by trustees of a deceased lessor to recover rent under a lease providing for a monthly
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rental of one hundred dollars. The defendant was allowed to
set up an oral agreement alleged to have been made a week before
the execution of the lease that the rental was to be seventy-five
dollars so long as she occupied the premises but was to be one
hundred dollars if anyone else occupied them.
The Superior Court affirmed the jtdgment for defendant,
holding that the oral agreement was properly admitted. In addition to arguing that the written lease governed, plaintiff took the
position that the alleged verbal promise was inadmissible since it
was not alleged to have been made contemporaneously with the
execution of the lease but a week earlier. Judge Trexler, for the
court said, however, "This is taking too narrow a view of the
meaning of the word 'contemporaneous'." 5s Yet the Supreme
Court had a few years earlier rejected evidence of an alleged oral
agreement on the ground that it had taken place in one case 59
five days before and in another case 6 0 "several days" before the
written lease was executed and so, the court said, was not contemporaneous within the rule.
An interesting case came before the Supreme Court almost
a score of years ago and presents an example of the application
of the exception to the parol evidence rule even though there is
no allegation that the parol agreement induced the signing of the
lease.6 1 The facts are not clearly stated in the report but it appears that the defense set up to plaintiff's action of ejectment was
an alleged parol agreement that plaintiff would surrender its lease
for cancellation in the event that certain things happened and it
was averred that they had occurred. The evidence was admitted. On appeal, it was argued that since there was no allegation
that the contemporaneous parol agreement was the inducement
for the signing of the lease, the offer should have been rejected.
"Delaware County Trust Co., Trustee v. Kennan, 78 Pa. Super. 341 (zg2).
"Williams et al. v. Notopolos, 259 Pa. 469 (i918). The court, after deciding the oral agreement was inadmissible because not contemporaneous, then
went the full distance: "There was no all6gation that anything was left out
of the lease by fraud, accident or mistake, and in the absence of such an averment, the terms of a written instrument are not to be varied by setting up a
parol agreement, even though it was contemporaneous with the execution of
the written document."
" Shields v. Hitchman, 251 Pa. 455 (i9z6).
Phillips G. & 0. Co. v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 213 Pa. x83 (igo6).
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The Supreme Court affirmed, however, on the "fraudulent use"
doctrine. "If the plaintiff company refused to surrender the
lease for cancellation in violation of its parol agreement and asserted its right to the possession of the premises by virtue of the
instrument, it was a fraud

.

.

and an attempt to make a

fraudulent use of the lease. Parol evidence will be received in
such cases to defeat the fraud." 62 It is evident that the alleged
oral agreement had the effect of nullifying the writing.
In a Superior Court case, 63 Judge Orlady said: "The English rule that parol evidence is inadmissible to vary the terms of a
written instrument has long since been departed from in this
state; and since that departure a constant temptation has existed
to change the terms of a writing by any and all kinds of evidence,
to reach equity, or what is fancied to be equity between the parties." The action was for the unlawful taking of cattle. The
plaintiff had been tenant under defendant. A lease was offered
in evidence reciting that the cows belonged to defendant and
were to be returned by plaintiff at the end of the term. Plaintiff
offered to prove an oral inducing agreement that the milk which
defendant was to receive by the terms of the lease was to be used
in payment of the cows, and that the cattle belonged to plaintiff, the lease being made to protect defendant from plaintiff's
creditors. The Superior Court said the evidence was admissible
but reversed because the lower court had not made it plain, in
charging the jury, tlat the agreement must be proved by clear,
precise and indubitable testimony.
It has been pointed out above that a test sometimes applied
to determine the admissibility of evidence of alleged oral, contemporaneous, inducing agreements is to ask whether the oral
agreement contradicts anything in the writing. If it does not and
particularly if it has to do with something that is not specifically
covered in the writing, the tendency has been to admit it, even
though it is so connected with the subject-matter of the writing
that "parties ordinarily agreeing in regard to it would have included it in the written contract."
op. i88.
Miller v. Wise, 33 Pa. Super. 589 (9o7).
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An interesting problem arises where the effect of the alleged
oral, contemporaneous agreement would be to contradict an implication of law in connection with the written contract. If no
time of performance is mentioned in a contract, the law implies
that a reasonable time is given; may one of the parties introduce an oral agreement that a specific time had been agreed upon?
The authorities are not in accord,64 but what is probably the
majority view holds the evidence inadmissible. The question was
involved in a Pennsylvania case some years ago although the decision rests on other grounds. A lessee attempted to show an
oral agreement that he might remove certain fixtures at the end
of the term although there was nothing to that effect in his lease.
By the common law, the lessee would have no such right. The
Supreme Court held that the evidence was not admissible since
there was no allegation of fraud, accident or mistake.65
BONDS AND MORTGAGES

The situation most frequently arising under this classification has to do with the attempt of the mortgagor, when sued on
an unrestricted judgment bond, to set up a verbal agreement
that there was to be no personal liability but that the obligee
should look only to the mortgaged premises. In the latest case,
the defense was permitted to prevail. Mr. Justice Walling said
the rule admitting such evidence is "undoubted" so long as the
parol agreement is established by clear, precise and indubitable
testimony. 66
In a case arising one year earlier,67 the same member of our
Supreme Court laid down the same general principle as consti'See
58 U. OF PA. L. REv. 312 (909), "Parol Evidence Inadmissible to
Contradict Implication of Law from Written Contracts." Also 5 WIGMoaE.
EVWENCE, § 2445.
'Hamilton v. Fleck, 249 Pa. 6o7 (i915). The decision rested mainly on

the provision in the lease regarding the return of the premises to lessor in the
same condition, which clause could not be contradicted by parol, said the court.
'Hubert v. Meyers, 279 Pa. 171 (1924). "That a contemporaneous parol
agreement, on the faith of which a written instrument was executed (here
delivered), may be shown is undoubted, but the former must be established by
clear, precise and indubitable evidence."
'Dixon v. Minogue, 276 Pa. 562 (1923). "Under our practice a party
to a written instrument may prove he executed it on the faith of a contemporaneous parol agreement modifying the former . . . but such proof must
be clear, precise and indubitable . . . "
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tuting "our practice" but disallowed the alleged oral agreement
since defendant had offered to prove it by his own uncorroborated
testimony. What defendant had sought to prove was that the
mortgages, absolute obligations in the usual form on their face,
were given as security for past and future advances, and not for
moneys received at the time. In another case,68 the defendant
was not permitted to rely on a verbal agreement that there would
be no personal liability on the bond when it appeared that the alleged promise was made several days before the execution of the
bond and mortgage.
The converse of the usual situation arose in a case 6' where
the plaintiff attempted to set up a contemporaneous promise, on
the faith of which he had signed, that defendant personally would
pay the mortgage, although the mortgage recited that recourse
was to be had against the mortgaged premises only. The trial
court refused to receive the testimony on the ground that it contradicted the writing. The Supreme Court affirmed, not for the
reason that the alleged oral promise contradicted the express provision of the mortgage, but apparently on the one ground that
the offer was to prove by one witness alone and that this was not
sufficient.
CONCLUSIONS

The following principles and decisions are to be found in
our Supreme and Superior Court Reports in cases in which one
of the parties to a written instrument has for one reason or another attempted to set up an oral, contemporaneous promise or
agreement alleged to have been made by the other party and without which he avers he would not have affixed his signature:
(I) The evidence is admissible since the oral agreement
*concerned the use to which the written instrument might be put,
IShields v. Hitchman, 251 Pa. 455 (i916).
'Neville v. Kretzschmar, 271 Pa. 222 (1921).

Mr. Justice Schaffer, in

the opinion, said: "In the absence of an allegation that something was omitted

from a written instrument by fraud, accident or mistake, or a contemporaneous
parol promise was made to induce its execution, it cannot be overthrown or

modified by oral evidence."

This is certainly true but if it implies that a

written instrument may be modified or overthrown by a contemporaneous, inducing, parol promise, later opinions by the same member of the court make
clear that he has come to a different conclusion.
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and to allow one of the parties to use the writing in a way that
would violate the oral promise which induced its execution would
be a fraud on the other party.
(2) The evidence is admissible for the reason that Pennsylvania has always recognized as exceptions to the strict parol evidence rule all cases in which the execution of the writing was
induced by a contemporaneous, verbal understanding or agreement, and has permitted such agreements to be introduced into
evidence.
(3) Evidence of the contemporaneous, oral, inducing promise or agreement is admissible but the promise or agreement must
be established by evidence that is clear, precise and indubitable
and if the offer is not to prove it by such testimony, it should be
rejected.
(4) The evidence is admissible because it has to do with
something that is not specifically covered by the contract although
concerned with the same subject-matter as that involved in the
writing.
(5) The testimony is admissible because it appears (a) that
the oral contemporaneous agreement was intended to be included
in the writing, but was inadvertently, although knowingly, omitted therefrom, or (b) that it was purposely omitted by both parties and one is now attempting to act in a manner which would
constitute a breach of it.
(6) Evidence of the alleged contemporaneous, inducing
promise is inadmissible because (a) it would have the effect of
nullifying the writing, or (b) it contradicts an express provision
of the written instrument, or (c) it has to do with the same subject-matter as the written contract, the writing is complete and
unambiguous, and ordinary parties coming to any such agreement
as that alleged to have been made orally would have included it
in the writing. The only circumstances under which a full, dear,
valid contract may be affected by some agreement outside it are
those involving fraud, accident or mistake. In the absence of
these, the written agreement between the parties governs.
The above may at times be a convenient assortment of decisions, offering as it does authorities for practically every pos-
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sible position, but it is not a satisfactory state in which to have the
law. Imagine the predicament of the lawyer who is called upon
to advise his client whether a contemporaneous, oral agreement,
upon which his whole case depends, is admissible. The trial judge
in ruling on its admissibility is in a similar position.
It is high time our appellate courts cease including in opinions the general and untrue statement that contemporaneous, oral
promises on the faith of which a written instrument was executed
may always be shown. If they do say so, then it should be the
result of a determination that the law should be just that. What
*e need most of all is consistency.
There is no reason, however, why such evidence should be
admissible. The fact that an alleged oral agreement may have
been contemporaneous with the execution of the writing is not a
sdtfficient reason; indeed it is merely another reason why the
agreement, if made, should have been included in the writing, if it
was in the minds of the parties at that very time. The fact that
such. oral promises or agreements are said to have induced the
execution of the written instrument is likewise no reason for admitting them in evidence; if they were so important as to induce
the execution, they were important enough to be included in the
writing. It may be said truthfully that practically everything
that is said prior to the execution of the writing is more or less
responsible for the execution so that everything should be merged
in the writing which results.
.We have seen that such evidence was first admitted to prevent what the courts deemed to be fraud. That reasoning has
long since been repudiated, but, apparently without recognizing
that the foundation was missing, the courts have continued to use
the rule until it has become a great super-structure without fouiidation. ' Some writers have said the evidence should be admitted
to prevent what would be as much a fraud as the actual misrepresentation of an existing fact. Yet they have nothing to say to
the proposition that it is equally tantamount to a fraud on the
other party to allow-one party to a written instrument to set up
alleged oral agreements when there is a rule of law, upon which
all should have the right to rely safely, that all prior negotiations
are merged in a written instrument. -
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Where the parol evidence rule should apply, that is to say
where there is a full, 70 complete, unambiguous 11and valid contract subsisting between the parties to the action 72 and the writing is directly and not collaterally involved in the sUit,73 there
should, where no fraud, accident or mistake is proved, be no exception to the rule recognized in the case of so-called contemporaneous, oral agreements having to do with the use to which an
instrument would be put or otherwise. It is not a hardship to
make the parties to a written contract reduce every part of their
agreement to writing.
The test applied in Gianni v. Russell & Co. is the solution to
many of the questions presented by the whole subject. When it
appears that a written agreement was executed by the parties
who are before the court, which agreement is "a complete legal
obligation without any uncertainty as to the object or extent of
the engagement," and one of the parties offers to set up an oral
agreement made at the same time, its admissibility, when disputed, should be determined by asking whether the oral agreement comes within the field embraced by the written one. "This
can be answered by comparing the two, and determining whether
parties, situated as were the ones to the contract, would naturally
and normally include the one in the other if it were made. If
they relate to the same subject-matter and are so interrelated that
both would be executed at the same time, and in the same con"' If the contract is only partly in writing, of course the parol evidence
rule does not apply. Huessener v. Fishel & Marks Co., 281 Pa. 535 (1924) ;
Kerr v. McClure, 266 Pa. io3 (i92o) ; Federal Sales Co. v. Farrell, 264 Pa.
149 (i99); Gelber v. Western Nat. Bank, 53 Pa. Super. 155 (913).

'The courts should be careful not to admit evidence avowedly offered
to explain but which in reality varies and otherwise comes within the rule.
Evidence offered for the purpose of explaining the meaning of the contract
was rejected for this very reason in York Haven W. & P. Co. v. American
Phosphorus Co., 229 Pa. 194 (i91o). It seems to the writer that ina recent
case inadmissible evidence was said to be admissible under the guise of explaining an ambiguity. See Simon v. Myers, 284 Pa. 3 (i.5).
2 Parol evidence to vary or modify a writing
may be given by strangers
to the writing, Gill's Estate, 268 Pa. 5oo (192o), where such third persons
do not claim through a party to the writing and do not seek to enforce some
right or benefit thereunder. Johnson v. Stewart, 243 Pa. 485 (1914). See,
also, Roberts v. Cauffiel, 283 Pa. 64 (I925).
"The parol evidence rule does not apply where the writing sought to be
affected is only collaterally in issue. Hanauer v. National Surety Co., 279 Pa.
345 (924).
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tract, the scope of the subsidiary agreement must be taken to be
covered by the writing. This question must be determined by
the court."
Professor Wigmore suggests that the intention of the parties is the important factor in determining whether the alleged
extrinsic agreement was covered by the writing. He points out
that in order to arrive at the intention, it is necessary to hear evidence as to the nature of the negotiations, as looking at the writing would not be sufficient. "Thus the apparent paradox is committed of receiving proof of certain negotiations in order to determine whether to exclude them; and this doubtless has sometimes seemed to lower the rule to quibble. But the paradox is
apparent only." 74
There unquestionably are occasions when it would be necessary to go through the procedure outlined by the learned writer
but it is submitted that, in the average case, the admissibility of
an extrinsic agreement set up to affect a written instrument can
be properly determined by a mere comparison of the two. If the
extrinsic negotiation is such that it should have been included in
the writing as having to do with an important feature of the same
subject-matter, it ought, if objected to by the other party to the
contract, to be rejected. Otherwise it is absurd to speak of the
integrity of written instruments. Promises, agreements, understandings regarding the same subject-matter as that covered by a
written instrument deliberately executed with both parties presumably knowing that all prior negotiations are merged therein
ought not to be listened to where there is no fraud, accident or
mistake present, irrespective of whether they were contemporaneous with the signing of the writing, regardless of whether it is
alleged they induced the signing, and despite the fact that they
may be said to be concerned with the use to which the writing
might be put. The reasoning which led the early Pennsylvania
courts to take the contrary view is unsound, and has been said
to be so by the later courts; it would seem to follow that cessante
ratione legis cessat ipsa lex.
Earl G. Harrison.
Philadelphia,Pa.
"5 WIGmom,

EVIDENCE, § 2430.

